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TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE ALLIANCEI

Viewed historically, alliances tend to be ephemeraL i~-_stitutions, being established to deal temporarily with shifting political events.

AU iances tend to be. most efficacious

at the moment of creation, not at tater dates.
NATO,· Edgar Furniss said

11

Referring to

the Alliance had already emerged

•••

when the ·Treaty was signed.

Like most treaties, the North

Atlantic Pact pub) icized and made 6fficia1 the pre-existing
re l a t ions h i p • 11 Al l i an c es tend . to suffer a t r op h y over t i me

I

I

unless the conditions attending creation remain constant or

I

a given alliance reflects the dynamic change experienced
by the political actors themselves~

If NATO and/or the

Warsaw Pact continue to.be v.iable, they must have accommodated the changes in the structural and behavioral environment; erse. they:would have suffered the same fate as_ tENTO and SEATO
•

•

¥

they would have become anomalies awaiting final abrogation.
The political process is dynamic, witnessing changes
fueled by. te~hnological

innovattons and demographic trans-

formations that occur with accelerating frequency and
pressure. - New economic and social catastrophes occur before the last have been understood, much 1ess dealt with

adequately.

Economists debating the ca~ses of and solu-

tions for inflation bear striking resemblance to their
medieval precursors concerned about. angels and pinhea~s~
Their soluti~ns ~re often so contrad1ctory. as to belie

•
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credibility~
ful

Yet remarkably, economics is- far more success-

in deal irig with multivariate analyses and mathematical

' ·•
modelling than are other political and social sciences.

Apparently, the type of subject we are most con~erned
.with simplydefies pseudo-molecular, __ reduction permitting
examination of parts of the whole to determine phenomenal
behavior.

We must examine the

11

big picture 11 leading to

the temptation of enlarging the composition'to global
dimensions projecting pseudo-systemi~ observations greatly exceeding our intellectual grasp.

Conceptualizing a global

system requires assumptions of national and regional behavior
that can only be defended by exaggerated ambiguity.

Thus

alliances and political blocs become actors distinguishable
from their members· and occasionally superior to them.

Thii

,·

is sometimes said: Be~ause of her membership in NATO, France
(or A,B,C,w •• n) must pursue a policy of x in y~

Rumania must

do x because of her position in the Warsaw Pact •. Students
ask,

11

Wh a t _i s NATO_ ' s po s i t i o n . r e g a r d i n g Nam i b i a o r t h e

Middle East? 11 and we ·tend to utter plausable generalities
when truthfully, NATO does not ~onduct foreign pol icy but is
part of the foreig~ pol icy of each-discrete member state.
The· e s s en t i a 1 a c to r s i n i n t e r n a t i o ri a 1 po 1 it i c s a r e
nation states, not individuals, ·international organizations
or other coalitions.

The predominant mode of interaction in

world politics remains bilateral despite the proliferation
of multilateral organi.zations since.World War II.

Even an
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a 1.1 i a n c e s u c h a s NATO i s b a s i c a 1 1 y a s e t -of b i 1 a t e r a 1 r e l a t i on ships enca•ed in a m~ltilateral framework: NATO ~omprises 105
dyads. -- a rather complex n·etwork indeed.

Obviously no_t al 1

dyads are equally inieresting or important, yet one can almos~
never be sure which dyads might assume importance at certain
ti mes. ·
Oft.he multilateral alliances entered into since.World
War I I, only NATO and WTO remain ~iable and ~ignificant, .
largely by reason of mutual reinforcement.

Were one to dis-·

appear the other might well vanish to be neither missed nor
yearned for save by ·those of us who _invested so much time and
thought.
Interrelationships· change over time resulting in concomitant-· changes in dyadic relationships. · The basic elements
of the rationale for NATO and WTO remain: US-USSR·confl itt and
.

Ea s t - w·e s t b ro c - con f 1 i ct.

.

0 f co u rs e , . NATO was . founded in 1 9 4 9 ,

the height of the "Cold War" and 1979 is marked by

11

detente 11 ,

yet, stripped of rhetoric, the two conditions are not all that
dissimilar •.

11

Cold war 11 and

11

detente 11 are but two sides of the

same coin: superpower rivalry and corifl ict.
Cold wars typically develop between· the strongest al 1 jes
in a receitly ended ~ar so we need not agonize about c~uses of
US-Soviet hostility, it arose .o~t of victory over Ge~many.and
Japan.

Upon ending a major war.as debilitating as World War II,

exhausted victors cast suspicious glances to see if any threats
lurk in the wings.

Dnly Russia and America could threaten each
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other and· the threats loomed more ominously as th~ir exhaustion passed.

~ermany was dism~mbered and occupied, Japan was

occupied and once mighty Britain and Franc~ were prostrate as
though they h~d lost the war.

No state posed a threat to the

superpowers save for each.other and they lapsed i.nto a condition of mutual fear and suspicion that~~ar exc~eded rational
bounds.
.·

Fear was endemic among governments of the. period and provided the necessary and sufficien~ condltlons for forming
all la~ces that were to prove to be enduring and relatively
·stable.

Tha postwar illiances reflected the conditions a~tend~

ing their formation, providing adequate justification for
discrete national decisions to ally.
· .US-USSR relations .provided a necessary but insufficient
justificati6n for the form~tion of hostile alliances.

WTO,

having been !created in response to NATO, ne.eds 1 ittle elaboration at this point.

But the J~stification for NATO· must be

sought in the div~rse motivations

reflected by the adherents

to the pact.
II

Several factors. must be examined: fj rst, Europe had been
devastated by the war; second~ power shifted away from
traditional European power centers; and third, the motivations for accession were complex rather than simple.·

Each of

these items will- be taken _up briefly -- the format of this

.
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paper proscribes·detailed analysis.
Little need be said about the devastation wrought by the·
war.

Each of the European belligerents was in dire economic

straits a~d most forecasters predicted that relative privation
would contlnue inde~i~itely and that the burgeoning US economy
would be invulnerable to challenge, th~t the US economy would·
dwarf all others. forever.

No one believed that European states
.

.

would regain their ear·1 ier lead, although Britain was generally
assigned an outslde change of achieving a role of some significance.
Of course, fears generated bi immediate economic distress
proved short-1 ived; however, those feari played a large part tn
motivating the European founders of NATO.

Their vulnerability

to possible Soviet aggrandizement was enhanced by the sca_rcity
of economic and mil'itary resources available to them.
.

They

·,

. were not, nor would they likely ever. be self-reliant vis-a-vis
the USSR~

European security required American participation

to offset Soviet power~
NATO, we must keep in mind, was a European not an American
product, having been based so closely upon the model provi'ded
by the Br us s e 1 s Pact ( 1 9 4 7 ) .

·Amer i can par t'i c i pat i on i n the

alliance resulted inevitably in the Americanization of the
. pact - there was no gainsaying .us hegemony.
This- brjngs us to the-second factor 1 isted above, the
shift of power from European to non-European centers, if I
may refer to the Soviet Uni-0n as a non~European power center.
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Prior to the two World Wars (which may appropriately be viewed
as one epochal phenomehon), Central and Western Europe were
unrivaled as the power center for worJd politics.

Most of the

wo.rld was parcel led out to diverse Eueopean imperial domains·
or influerice spheres.

The United States and·Russia were

~ariously excluded or excluded _themselves from playing .a major
role and Japan's drea~s of becoming an imperial giant were
dashed by the second war.
The ·European decline was traumatic, expensive and destabtl izing.

Transfers of power were not always ma9;nanimo.usl_.y or grace-

fully accomplished.

Diverse European withdrawals were forced

upon the British in Palestine, India and-Burma, the French· in
the Levant, and the ~utch fn Indonesia, to mention but a few
cas·es.

In each of these i.nstances·, withdrawal ·was promoted

and abetted by Amer~can (and Soviet} pressure and support for·
national independence.

America's leaders were largely un~

tutored in the role of wo~ld leadership, weje inexperienced
in the often Byz~ntine rites of world power manipulation and
were frequently clumsy in projecting national goals and
policies.
Pow~r center movement from European to non-Europe~n
actor~ was not a·cosmetic change; rather, the.consequences.
for Europe were profound and pervasive •.

European concerns

were sublimated to"the ri~alry between two superpoweis who
were only secondarily pr~occupied by Europe:

US officials

were not always sen~itive td the needs of European govern-
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.

11.,.:.,-

ments as was demonstrated by the style and confent of American
deportment vis-"a;..vis the.British re Skybolt "(1961), the French.
at the Geneva Conference (1954), an~ Britain and France at Suez
(1956), the Dutch in Indonesia, for example.

American pol icy expresses and ·projects US interests,
not int~rests of a coal it ion of states except as sudh interests
coincide with American design.

By re~son of its hegemonic

position in NATO~ especially ih the first two decades, US
strat~gic pol icy was co~erminous with all lance strategic
pol icy.

Changes in US strategic· pol icy were ex-pressed, in

part, as changes in all lance pol icy because NATO was an instrument of US foreign pol icy and. because the European me~bers were
dependent upoh the US.

That ~~pendence has diminished in in-

tensity over the ~ears but.Am~iican strategic hegemony re~ains

in effect.
Dependence in the early-post war period was a profound
influenc~ in formulating the diverse national foreign policies
among the European~powers ~nd with the superpowers.

~ut

dep~nderice was not a sufficient element in determJning n~tional
motivation for al 1 lance, the third factor mentioned earlier.
Motivations underlying foreign pol icy are difficult to
identify and are ~ever·as simple as w~ often like to pretend.
For convenlence,

I shall distinguish among core_and fla~k

members: the former being .those former members of the Brusse 1 s
Pact plus ~est Germany, Canada and the US; and the flank comprising Denma~k, Norway, Greece, Turkey, Portugal and Iceland.
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.

;t.:r

I distinguish the fla~k m~mbers as those who were attracted
to or recruited for the pact because of their strategic loca·tions in NATO's posture vis-'a·.;.vis· the USSR.
Of the core members, the US and the Federal Republic of

.

.

Germany fRG) are most critical and have been fro~ the beginning, well before FRG membership in NATO.

France and the Low

Countries (Belgium, the Netherlands a~d Luxembourg -- BENELUX)
particularly sought to commit a US military presence in Europe
to pol.ice Germany whose renascence was promoted by the Americans
almost immediately upon the defeat of the Nazis.
US policy reflected ~onviction th~t West Germany had to
be estab1 ished as a viable ecoriomic and military force if
European recovery were to be achieved.

Little concern was

e~idenced among Americans about possible German revanchism.
J~ typical Amerlcan problem solving fashion, we were convinc~d that the pro~lem posed by Germin militarism and ultranational ism had been solved by World War 11. · Now European
recovery must be ~chieved, else Europe would be vulnerable to
Soviet aggrandizement.

From late 1945 and early 1946 through

the coup~ Prague (.1948), US policy makers became_more and
more convinted that the USSR would march into Western Europe
or would otherwise extend h~~ dominion whenever such a moie
would not meet with too costly resistarice.

The' utter _devasta-

tion and prostration of European armies and societies whetted
Ame r i c a n f ea i- s of Ru-s s i a n d e pr av it y..

On 1 y a r e s t o r e d We s t e r n

Europe buttres.sed by a remilitarized, renovated, albeit

I
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truncated Germany_could pr~vide a stable guarantee against
such. Russian action.
To France and her BENELUX neighbors, .American designs
for Germany comp) icated policy making since the permanence
of.German defe~~ was not taken for granted.

For France the

old problem of rationalizing resource production and distiib~tion between Lo~raine and the Ruhr remaihed unresolved
and the dr~position of the Saar Basin was yet to be determined .
. The~e issues helped to fuel prior ~ranco-German wars and they
could not be dismissed lightly •
. Traditionally~ the economics of Belgium, the Netherlands
and Luxembourg have tended to be dominated by that of Germany;
indeedl the latter two part·icularly have tended to be extensions
of the German economy.

With postwar economic recovery especially

coupled with anticipated German recovery., German. economic
hegemony would likely be restored also. ·withou.t· German
reco~e~y, the Low Countries could anticipate· only a trunc~t~d
level of indigenous growth.

Thus, as with the French, these

governments were faced by a paradox: German recovery was both
required and feared.
i

Faced w·ith growing US pressure for German normalization
(includi~g military) ~nd with German economic regeneration~
France and Belgium, particularly and severally, pressed the
need f~r a continued US presence upon the Americans.

Paul-

He.nri Spaak said t.hat Belgium· inevLtably would.be dominated
by a he·.gemon·ic pow.er and that the US would 1 ikely be more
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benign than_either France or Germany, if only because of their
propinquity. On its part, Franc~ insisted upo~ US particJpation
.

'

in the Western Alliance as the price for acquiescence in FRG
militarization.
Other political and economic costs (o~port~nitie~?) were
imposed upon Germany· as the p.rice of assuming a more normal·
role;

including.:(1) renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons;

(2) acceptance of indefi.nite stationing of foreign troops in
.FRG territory; (3) acqui~scence in French (and BENELUX) penetration of FRG economy; and (4) subl Imation of FRG political
initiative and ambiti~n in the guiie ~f E~rope~n integration.
Nbne of these items were forced upon Germany -- each was agreed
to voluntarily an.d with some reaL alacrity by Chancellor
Adenauer and· his successors •. · lut this set of items defines
a subordinate role for Germany ~hat.belies pres~nt reality.
Renouncing nuclear wea~ons in 1954 was neither daring nor
limiting in a world comprising but two principal nuclear powers,
the

US

and

USSR

(plus Britain, of course).

With increasing

proliferation of nuclear· powers in the last decades of this
century~ a non-nuclear Germany could be at some disadvantage.
While providing some quarantee of assistance in the event
of. a Russi'an invasion, the various allied military forces upon
German territory prolong a ~ubordinat~ military role that is
becoming anachron_istic.

Britain's ages-old dream of station-

ing an army on the continent was finally achieved with th~
British Army of.the Rhine-~ but such a feat was analogous
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to a conquest post impote~ce

1t has hardly been noticed.

As de Gaulle understood when he evicted NATO offices and
personnel fro~ Franc~~ the mere stationing of foreign niil itary
personnel restricts and 1 imits national freedom of action.
Starting with the European Coal and Steel Communi.ty
, (EtSC), the diverse institutions_·of the newly evolving
European Community have provided d'iSproportionate benefits to Germany's -s~ociates.

The ECSC provided Fran~e with Ruhr ore

while giving'Germany access to coking·coal that was inferior
to that which the FRG cont.inued to obtain from Sweden.
Similarly the Common ~atket opened the German hinterland to
Dutch,, Belgian and Luxembourgeoise penetration.

And th_e Common

Agricultural Policy was a triumph for French agriculture
imposing _net costs upon the other members of~the community,
particularly upon Germany and, ·,eventually, the United Kingdom
(UK).
.

.

Obvio~sly, Germany h-s not suffer~d by reason of association.

The Wirtschaftswunder was ihe ra~Jd prosperity of the

German economy of this period.

None can say that FRG pros~

perity ~ould have been greater had Germany chosen to follow
a ~ol itary path.

We cannot know how things would have

developed had conditions been different because they were not
different.
Sublimation has resulted in an FRG posture as if it has_
no pol icy separate froni her al 1 ies in NATO and/or fellow
members in ·the European Community.- Since NATO does not make
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pol icy ·and'th_e-El: is -not: an. integrated,_ supranational entLty,
FRG sublimation is more mythical than realistic.

The posture

resulted _in the maintenanie of a _lo~ profile which was quite
ins~rumental unt.il recent developments which will be discussed
subsequently.

I I I

Conditions within and without the all lance have changed
si~nificantly since NATO was created some thirteen years ago.
The p r i n c i pa 1 ch an g es have t rans f o rm e d the r o. l es , s tat u re ,
and salience of the USSR, the US and the FRG and have
created concomitant changes in the structure and. behavior of
alliances.
In the first quarter century_·arter World War II, _the
USSR restricted activities to regions adjacent to Russian
territory - a not insignificant area but certainly not one
likely to challenge US power directly.

Increasingly over the

ye a r s the- Ru s s i an s have as s e rte d a much mo re act i v e r o 1 e , . p r oj e ct in g themselves as a truly global po~er challenging the US
in Africa, Latin America, Asia, and .the Middle East.

The

ch~llenge has even extended to the Caribbean with the
appearance 9f Sriviet naval vessels challenging the traditional
American naval supremacy in the area.

The development of

Soviet naval power to the extent that .it challenges American
hegemonic control over the seas ~ignaled the arrival of the
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Soviet Union to parity ~ith the United States·:as a super-power.
Once parity had been achieved, the ba~ic structure of the
world pol itica1 system was modified.

The traditional role -

the role that had been asserted as traditional - of the_United
States as the g1oba1 power containing Soviet po1 itica1-mil itary
actions to th~ Eurasian arena was no 1ongei oper~nt.

Thi

_Russians are now capable-of and engage in challenging America's
'.

domain in all regions.

Onc_e challenged, the American domain was

unmasked for what it really was all along; that is, a mythical
·domain not a· truly imperial domain in the manner,. say, of the
British in th~ nineteenth century.
With the new structure of world politics the diverse

I

I
I

element~ of regional arrangement~ have be~n modified significantly
also.

Europe bec~mes more impottant in some respects and far

fess important in.others;

While Soviet power and influence

was confined to the Eur~sian land mass, ~estern Europe was
the·focal point for US-Soviet interaction because of the
geographic proximity of the.ir military forces • . Even as
recent 1y as the Yorn Kiippur War ( 1973), it was d iff i cu 1 t for
the Russians to express a presenc~ be~ause of the lack of
delivery vehicles for transporting troops, etc.

~ithin th~

next five or six years~· the Russians were able to _demonstrate
a significant capability to intervene in force in distant
places with the act.ion. in Ethiopia during her war with
Soma 1 i a.
Both relatively and absolutely, the US role was diminished

I
I
j

I

I
i .
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by the increased salience of Soviet power.

Yet more -important

for the United States role were severaL other factors: first,
ihe war in Vietnam and its consequences; and second, the demise
of American hegemony in the ihternational etonomic arena.

The

principal result of American involvement in Vietnam was the
frustration of American pol icy (which had never been adequately
defined) and the concomita~t depletion of American military
and· econom.ic resources at home and abroad, particularly
evidented in the gradual decline of "the efficacy of American
forces in Europe.

The Americ~n public was soured on the

util i~y of intervention and the Congress p~oceeded to enact
legislation attempting to delimit the presidency~ particularly
regarding the discretionary power to implement and ~xecute
p·olicy.

These are ephemeral

items.and.we have already

witnessed some degree of dissatisfaction among the public and
the C~ngress for the reduction of American resolve and the
performance of the ~residency; however, the Carter Administration1s anti-imperial stance reflected well the climate
of opinion at-the time of President Carter 1s election to
office.

Americans apparent 1y do not like what they opted

for, but it seems to me that Carter expressed very wel-1 and
continues to express very well what they wanted ..
In the economic arena, the end of the Bretton Woods
era has not been .replaced by somethJng equally instrumental
or effective.

The Bretton Woods system relied upon the United

States dollar as,_virtually, the s~le hard-currency, the

II

I
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r e s e r v e cu r r en cy u po n wh i c h a 1 1 non - s o c i a 1 i s t po 1 i t i ca 1
'systems based their economies.

The.fixed exchange rate for

the dollar remained the basis fo~ the international economic
s y s t em wh i c h ha s been i n ·some t u·rm o i 1 s i n c e t h e do 1 1 a r wa s
permitted to float.:

Of yet more importance, the alacrity

with which the United States proceeded to finance the Vietnam
war in large measure by processing the payments deficit
particularly with other industrial countries has come home to
roost.

The chronic deficit in American balance of payments

has been used in large measure to finance American economic
g row t h a n d w,a s u s e d a s a n op t i o n to r a i s i n g t axe s a n d p a y i n g
.

'

for Vietnam out of current accounts.

The result was an

enoimous increase in the holdings of dollars abroad which
fue-led infl'ation in the United States and elsewhere.
"'

The

devaluation of the dollar in 1971 followed by its float
against other currencies resulted in the· reductio~ of
Ameritan Indebtedness abroad by ch~apening the value of the
currencies being ·held by others.

The hard dollar became

rather 1 imp.
Four principal factors have contributed~to the relative
diminutton of the US role in Europe:
1.

Gaullism and it~ successors;

3.

The.British malaise: and

4.

German economic resurgence.

Wh .i 1 e i n t e r re 1ate d .each i s .a ·s i g n i f i can t e 1 em en t wh Tc h might
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have sufficed in. itself to diminish the .American role.

The

combination of the four factors was rather overwhelming.
Having its origins in France under the presidency of
General de Gaulle (hence the naine), Gaullism today finds its
express i on best i n Br i t i sh po 1 i c y •

Gau 1 l i s m s t res s e d the.

independence of each member ·of NATO from the United States~
It reasserted"nationalism when all save for de Gaulle paid
homage to Monnet's grand design.

De Gaulle understood that

Eu r op e a n i n t e g r a t i on wa s a d ream , n o t a po 1 i c y , a n d. .t h a t
pursuit of the dream diverted atterttion from the burgeon1ng
p en e t r a t i on a n d con t r o 1 o f Eu r op e I s e co no mi e·s • Ch amp i on i n g
L'Europe des Patries,developing of the Force~ Frappe 7 evicting NATO offices and personnel from French terri.tory and
vetoing Br-itish accession to the treaty of Rome dramati.zed
independence from:the ·US, while careful~y retaining Fren~h
membership in the alliance •.
of _(French) national

De Gaulle stressed .the primacy

interests while promoting continuation

of ·the al 1 iance and of the US role in Germany.
The Gaull ist view was an alliance that was back to its
essentials prior to the increase in functional activities
during the fifties and sixties.

That made eminently good

iense if the Russians wer~ not expected to launch a conventional attack against Western Europe and if the allies
agreed to the continuation of the m11 itary presence in Germany.
NATO absorbed the French shift·· in poficy so readily because
i t d i d no t i n f a c t ch a n g e t h e d es

Lg n >

s t r u c t a r e o r po t e n t La 1

performance of the all i~nce in any way.

It did emph~size

I

..
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thi ~entral position of Germany in the alltarice

but that

. emphasis was not a surprising phenomenon for· any observers.
The impact of the (threatened) partial Arab 6il ~mbargo
during. the Yorn. Kfppur War (1973)coupled with OPEC success in
cartel izing .the world oil market reinforced burgeoning efforts
at national saparatidn from and identification with the US.
-It became apparent that each of the European states had to
make its own deals with Ar~b oiJ producers else it suffer
interruption of oil supplies as a consequence of Arab reactions
td American pol icy.
While the Dutch did not in the first instance make a
deal with the Arabs. independently an.d the European Community
(EC) sought to adopt a common pol icy in dealing with the
Arabs, both Britain and France earfy on decided to go it
a.lone because of their long an.d superior experience in dealing
with the Arahs. ·But, most importanti the Europeans wanted to
avoid having oil sanctions implemented against them as .a
co~sequence cf American pbl icy decisions in the Middle
East.
Once the United States decided to resume resupplying
Israel ~uring the 0~tober War, the vulnerability of American
supply was ma~nifie~ by the refusal of, eventually, all
European Allies to permit the-Uriited States to use European.
or NATO bases for such efforts.

Only Portugal permitted

shipment (via the.Azores)and th~t was prior to the revolution.

None of the structural changes made since 1973 (the

..

I
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I
International Energy Agreement, for example} has lessened

I

the impact of the changes wrought upon US-European re1ationshi_ps resulting from the_ above events.
Of the third factor 1"isted above, the British malaise,·
1 ittle need be said.

Whether Brit~in's economi~ misfortun~s

resuJt: from poor economic management, excessive welfare
·stat ism, low and dec1 ining· productivity, or from archaic labor.·
practices, Britain's role in the world economy has·declined, is
dec1 ining, and .will 1 ike1y continue to dec1 ine despite North Sea
oil and pol icy pronouncements.-. Obviously the development of
the North ·sea oil fields has improved the British balance

oi

p a y men t s s i t u a t i o _n a n d h a s r e s u l t e d - i n s om e i mp r o v em en t s
which are 1 ikely to have effect for the next decade ~r two;
·however, .the impact of the rel~tive dec1 ine of the Brftish
level of living (compared principally ·to those of Germany,
Switzerland, France,·Belgium,Holland),- industrial competitive
disadvantagel and structur•1 weakness of the pound (despite
recent improvem~nts) combine to heighten ~ercetved insecurity,
leading to attempts by British Governments- to follow an_ in·dependent course at.a time when such .independence may not be
fulfilling.

Not.even Churchillian or Rooseveltian metaphor
.

.

.is available to su~cor thepublic with dreams of·better
times.

And m'emori"es of special ,relationsh.ips with the US

that never were, offer no -compensation since the -US is perceived to be in apparent decline also;
Briti~h participation in the European communi.ty is
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ambivalent at best.
r'

,·d

Harmless as it .is l rkely to b·e, the

-

Eu rope an M'o net a r y

-s y s t em

( EMS ) i s deemed too con f i n i n g •

Ce r -

tainly if the pound continues to appreciate,8ritiih participation would be on a strongerba~sis

however the.push for British

participation would be lessened, not increased, by the •appreciation of the pound~

The relative strength of German and other

continental economies irritates and"exacerbates the sense of
inferiority that seems almost·palpable·at times.
The fourth factor, German economic resurgence, is the
most important of·these items.

Un.til recently, at inter-.

national meetings, one was always made aware _of the preoccupation of Europeans with the pervasiveness of American

..

economic hegemony •

Largely unnoti~ed; the US.economic role

,

in Europe· has be~n succe~ded to by the Federal Republic .of
Germany.

The· FRG is the st·rong' man of Europe.

The Deutsche

. mark provides .the under·p inning for most of the \-!es tern.
economies. including those of the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium,
Luxembourg, and even France.

Of benefit to German pol icy, ~he

Deutsche mark has not become a prin~ipal' reserve currency for
t.he European countries, the dollar and the Eurodollar remain
a s t he r e s e r v e c u r r en c y f o r Eu r op e . · As ha: s b e en s e en , re s. e r v e
c u r r en c i e s a r e v e r y v u 1 n e r a b 1 e · to .po l i c y c ha n g e s , i n c 1 u d i n g
collatiral attack, as the British learned and the Americ~ns
are learnin~ rather rapidly.
Rec en t German II i mm u n i t y II f r om i n f 1 a t i on res u rt s i n 1 a r g e
part from pol icy initiatives e~tered into at the expe~se of

·1
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t h e US . a n d , to some ex t en t , t h e UK, I t a Ly, Can a d a ,

~

tl.

FRG economic p61 icy discourages imports and encourages
exports while resiiting pressures to permit the Deutsche mark
becoming a res~rve currency.

This is· part of the motivation

be~ind Germany's championing of the EMS.

If EMS we~e success~

ful and Europe·an Currency Un its. (ECU) were to take the place
of dollars as some hope·, pressure on the dollar would accelerate while the Deutsche mark would still be protected from
overex.posure and vulnerability.
For the near term, the political economies of _Europe
will be dominated by West German economic poli.cy.

And

global trading patterns will reflect the va~illating fortunes

.

of the American dollar buff-eted by _the winds -of change in
Europe and elsewhere.

IV

The implications for NATO have been and wilt continue to
be profound.

Political, mi 1 itary, and strategic policies

c~nnot be kept indepen~ent from economic poli~y.

Chancellor

Schmidt's assertion of a pol iticar role arises because the
stakes for Germany no -longer permit the game to be. played.
as if Germany has no ~ol icy. · Of course Germany has· had
po 1 i c i es s i n c e the · days of -Ch an c e 1 1o_ r Aden au e r ; the s e 1 f effacing reluctance to be forthcoming has been removed.

,

.

.

Deten~e, we should ~emember~ received its impetus
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from-Chancellor Brandt's_ Ostpol itik initially condemned by
/

· Dr • Ki s s i n g e r who l a t er became - i ts ch amp i on •

.

Detente con-

tinues to be the most important aspect o~ German· foreign pol icy
.

be~ause Germany is so exposed ~eographically.

,,.

But detente

for Germany requir~s ~tronger, more assertive pol icie& by the
US than have bee~ forthcoming tn recent years.

Un11ateral can-

cellation of the Bl bomber and of·_the development of the neutron

a

wa r h ea d s , a p p a r en t v c i 1 1 a t i on i n An go 1 a , Som a_ 1 i a , I r a n a n d
.

,.

Korea all endanger detente because_ thiy diminish American
bargaining power to entice the Russ_ians to lessen their
military buildup.

- Indeed the neutron decision came only

after inducing Chancellor Schmidt to go ou.t on a J-imb in
favor of deploym~nt of the weapons~
•

Henry Brandon .said it this way:

11

What has ·profoundly.

upset Schmidt is what is perc"eived here [sona: as a basic
and misguided change i~ -US foreign policy t~ward the western·
·allies, namely Carter's rel.uctance to assume-respon~ibil ity
for t he s tat i on i n g of - med i um- range nu c l ea r b a 1 J i s t i c mi s s i l es
in Europe".

Schmidt has argued that Russian introduction of

SS-20 missiles has altered the European theate~ bal~nce and
.

.

that the Europeans need their own medium-range deterrent
capability.
Carter~s response tti Sch~idt's Alistair Buchari lecture
( 0 c to b e.r ,

1 9 7 7) was to s a y t hat i f the Eu r op-ea ns wan t such

i

a speci"al deterrent, they should·assume full
for· it.

i

responsibility

Largely unnoticed a,:id p!;)orly reported· in th_e
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United States at th~ time, this response by .the A~erican
president should have sent shock waves through the establishment.

Carter's response constituted an abdication of American

leadership since, .in the past, the US always accepted responsibility for strategic decisions.

The United States cannot

simply discard its role as a strategic hegemonic power without expecting serious consequences • . The responsibility
derives, as indicated earlier in th i's paper, ·from the
essential relationship between the United States and the
Soviet Union.

It is not based· on a mora 1 interpretation

of what the U~ited States role shculd be in .the best of all
possible worlds; rather it_ is a role developed out of the
ashes of .World War 11, nurtured by three decades of American
policy and has formed parts of the basis for European
s tr a te g i c , mi 1 i ta r y , . p o l i t. i c a 1 a n d e co no mi c po 1i ci es i n
t ha t . i n t er v a l .

Th ·e re seems to be no q u es t i on bu t t 'ha t
.

.

.

the Europeans, especially the West Germans, are prepared
to accept US leadership if the United States will continue
to accept that responsib.ility and.pay some attention to
European interests.

!f US leadership falters, the FRG has

recovered sufficient e~onomic_ strength to exercise leadership, albeit with some reluctance •
.

The tension between the United-States and. Germany. is
palpable and results from ihanging ~olitical economic
realities more than from differences between Schmidi and
Carter.

Schmidt is said to be disillusioned in the process
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i

of European integration leading to an EC with real pol iticaJ
power.

Brandon quotes a

. want to see

EC

11

senior aide 11 t.o Schmidt:

11

We don't

develop into a technocratic Euiope, ~aihly

conc•rned- with the developmerit. of steel, alcohol or agricultural mark~ts.

We want it to give Western Europe a

greater political vitality, not just a network of rules of
how to operate markets.If
Schmidt is concerned by British

11

insularity 11 in the EC

and with UK failure to support and erihance a political role
for Europe.

So Germany, the champion of British acceision

t O. t h e EC, t ur n e d t O F r an C e

W

h O S e hO S t i l i t y t O t h e US

S

in Ce

de Gaulle has continued unremittingly._ So too has Germany
pressed for the EMS hoping it would provide the needed
a

impetus for progre&s in developing a European community •.
More important, EMS was, according to Schmidt. 11 an attempt
on Bonn's part to lose the stigma of being a suburb of,
Washington".
The EMS is not likely to make Schmidt less restive because it is not 1 ikely· to .be significantly more effective
than the snake.

The p61itical economy of West Germany

requires German assertion of leadership because the economic
stakes -for Germany are so great and ~ecause the fu~ding of
approaches alternative to the·united ·
States are avai Jab le in Eu.rope only· to Germany because only
Germany could afford_ to~ financ~ a majo~ shift in p61 icy.

Iii
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'i

· The vitality of West Europe sou~ht by Schmidt must find
its principal leadership in Germany.

American initiatives in

Europe must account for and reflect German needs and pol [cies
else they wi_ll be frustrated by German nonparticipation.
Accommodating the interests of the.US and Germany will not be
easy nor tran~uil; tensions must be expected to increase since
the accommodation ~f ~erm•ny amounts to a transfer of power
within the Western alliance from the United States to Germany
and such a transfer of power will perforce produce anxiety
in 60th pa~tners and among the other all iesr
. Ten s ion s · w i t h t h e US S R on t h e . p a r t o f t h e US , F RG, a n d
other EC me~bers are 1 ikely.to increase for historic and
geopolitical reasons.·

If Chancellor Schmidt is correct in

his assessment of the need for a European deterrent to the·
SS~Z0 and if ~he US continues to take respo~sibility, will:
Germany accept the burden?

if German~ remains convinced of

the need fo~ a European deterrent and of US reluctance to
provide the means to meet this need, we must anticipate
German wil 1 ingness to do what is necessary to.accomplish the
ends of pol icy.

And what is necessary for Germany may not

.be necessary or desirable for the Uni~ed States.
Transformatio~ in Germany's roles in NATO and in Europe
make the al 1 iance·more difficult to manage and complicates
relations with the Soviet Union.
.

.

.

,

As I stated earlier, the
.

essence of detente rests with the US-USSR relationship.

This

is an -0verarching relationship within which Soviet/W~rsaw pact

...
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-interactions with Germany and the rest of Europe take place.
US-Soviet relations are global and essentially bi lateral ·as
they have been since Wor1d·War I I.

The new element rests _in

the fact that agreement between the two super-powers does not
automatically m~an that the a1lies will agree • . SimilariJy,
conflict between the two major powers does not imply confl let
between blocs~ as was demonstr~ted so effectively in October,··

1973.

While conflLcts in regions beyond.NATO'S territorial

jurisdictiori never apply directly to NATO, US hegemony
imposed strategic modifi~ations upon the all lance.

This no

longer holds; •indeed, the US today is the target for pressure
by the French-and Germans particularly to modify American
policy in regions quite dis:ant. from NATO; the Middle East,
for example.
Germany's new stat~s in NATO and the world re~urres stable
relationships amohg the major powers and lncreases the FRG
s take i n d{ten t e •

Geo po 1 i t i c aJ vu rn er ab i 1 i t y re q u i res Ge rm an

_ s J e z i n g o.f i n i t i at i v es

w h i ch

may make s tab i 1 i z at ion q u i t e
..

tenuous.

.

Were Germany to develop a unilateral response to

the SS-2O, the European and global balance would be altered
significantly.
Ge rm any.' s new s tat u s causes s t r u ct u r a l ch an g es i n the
.

.

alliance that a~e not amenable to cosmetic changes in the
alliance's organization.

To be sure, Germany would be more

secDre·if. responsibility for strate~ic ~odifications were
borne by a European· ent_ity or by the US.-- Germany's
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p o s i t i. on wo u 1 d be 1 e s s expo s e d ~
tion, and this

Bu t

t h e r ea J i t y of t h e s i t u a -

is terribly frustrating for Schmidt,

that a unified Europeanresponse_is _not at all

indicate

likely nor is

the Un i t e d St ates . 1- i k e 1 y. to act as a surrogate for Germany •
Despite the recent changes in constitutency representation -for the European parliament, the introduction of the
'European monetary system, and the.b~oadening of membership
· in the community-, there is 1 ittle 1 ikelihood that significant
~ u r op ea

e

n . i n t e g r a t i on w U l o c c u r •

Th r e is n o Eu r op e t h a t c a n

be juxtaposed to the Soviet Union but .there is a Soviet Union
that is i~mensely more po~erful
.

'

than that which helped to
.

trigger the formation of the alliance .•

The- Soviet threat that

a~iende~ the for~ation of NATO has been .supplanted by

one

which is far greater.in terms of Soviet capabilities, and.in
terms of the aggressiveness and.venturesomenesi of Soviet
pol icy.
While

do not think the danger to W~stern Europe is

posed by the threat of military

invasion of West Europe,

Soviet

policies may be more dangerous politically since the USSR can
and doe~ tha11enge the United States globatly,

As the Chinese

have noted on many occasions, NATO may be a very important
element in helping to modify and del imit:Russian geopolitical
ispirations~· if such aspirations can be inferred from- Soviet
con v en t i on a 1 a n d n u c le a r _ca p a b i 1i t y i n c r ea s e s •

